Introduction
The regulation of consumer credit is a subject that at regular intervals finds its way to the forefront of UK Government policy. Of particular concern is the fair treatment of consumer borrowers, and their potential vulnerability, recently highlighted by the problems in the 'payday' lending market. Credit is linked to whether its potential incompatibility will require its removal.
The purpose of this article is to consider these issues of effectiveness and compatibility. In order to do so, there naturally needs to be consideration of the rationale that underlies legal protection provided for the credit consumer. This requires not only an examination of legislative policy, but also interpretation of the law as evidenced by judicial decision. Here, the protective and selfinterest/reliance ethics outlined by Willett as observable in EU consumer protection law 11 provide a useful means of measurement. Although set in a different context, these ethics seem particularly appropriate to the unfair credit relationship test, as they are presented as integral to contextualising general fairness, or 'open-textured' 12 clauses. 13 The unfair credit relationship test seems to have much in common with these clauses. Whilst only applicable to consumer credit contracts, or agreements associated with such contracts, there is no doubt the test allows for a wide range of possible responses by the court, and stretches further than simply affecting creditor and debtor, 14 including consideration of not only substantive unfairness, but unfair practices as well.
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The article will therefore first discuss the direction of recent case-law applying ss 140A-C, the extent to which this reflects an underlying 'ethic' and to what extent this demonstrates achievement of the policy aims of the unfair credit relationship 11 C Willett 'General Clauses and the Competing Ethics of European Consumer Law in the UK' (2012) 71 CLJ (2), 412. 12 Ibid. 13 By 'general/open-textured' is meant flexibility and breadth in terms of applicability and interpretation, for example as demonstrated by Article 3(1) of the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Directive, transposed into UK law by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 1999, SI 1999/2083, reg 5(1), Willett, above n 11, p 412. 14 By allowing the actions of third parties and agreements connected with the credit arrangement to be subject to review by the court under s 140B. 15 Willett expressly refers to the potential for these ethics to apply to general clauses relating to unfair practices as well as terms, above n 11, pp 423-436. See H Collins for a discussion of 'open textured' rules and unfairness Regulating Contracts (OUP, Oxford, 1999) ch 11.
test. It will then give consideration to the appropriateness of the roles of protection and self/interest reliance in controlling consumer credit transactions and the extent to which the unfair credit relationship test is compatible with current regulatory developments. By adopting Willett's ethics, within the context of current academic discussion of consumer credit policy, 16 it will be argued that the underlying rationale of recent consumer credit legislation, with an emphasis of protection for the vulnerable, seems to indicate a preference for the protective ethic. This, it will be argued, has not, until the recent decision by the Supreme between underlying rationale, adherence to one 'ethic' alone is not the answer.
Protection of the consumer at all costs may not always be appropriate as the sole basis of framing regulation of consumer credit, so allowing self-interest/reliance a part to play. 16 In particular Professor Iain Ramsay, who has written extensively on this issue, whose and work in this area, the author has found helpful. See Most credit agreements, as long as entered into by an individual, 18 will be subject to ss 140A-C. The only agreements that will not be caught are regulated mortgage contracts, 19 (essentially first mortgages on the home) and any type of credit agreement to an incorporated borrower. 20 Leaving aside potential injustice to small business, 21 this 'gap' is filled to some extent by the FCA MCOB rulebook, 22 informed in part by the forthcoming implementation of the Mortgage
Credit Directive ('MCD').
MCOB imposes detailed obligations on mortgage
providers, for example in relation to disclosure, responsible lending and action on borrower default. 24 In response to the MCD and existing UK government policy, 25 18 This includes a business if sole trader or partnership of two or three (unless all the partners are bodies corporate-or unincorporated bodies -as long as not entirely consisting of bodies corporate s 189(1) CCA. Those provisions that have been transferred to CONC have retained this scope of debtor protection. 19 As defined in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Regulated Activities) Order 2001, S1 2001/544, Reg 61; CCA, s 140A(5)).
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As such a borrower is not an 'individual' for the purposes of the Act see n 18 above.
21
For a discussion of small business protection under the CCA see S Brown 'Protection of the small business as a credit consumer: paying lip service to protection of the vulnerable or providing a real service to the struggling entrepreneur?' C.L.W.R. 2012, 41(1), 59-96. 22 In force from April 2014. This was the result of a detailed review of the market conducted by the FSA over a number of years (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) , as a result of the financial crisis. Policy papers can be accessed at http://www.fca.org.uk/firms/firm-types/mortgage-brokers-and-home-financelenders/mortgage-market-review.See also FSA 'DP09/3 Mortgage Market Review' (2009) http://www.fca.org.uk/your-fca/documents/discussion-papers/fsa-dp09-3-mortgage-market-review ( last accessed Dec 2014). 23 FCA 'Implementation of the Mortgage Credit Directive and the new regime for second charge mortgages' CP14/20 (Sept 2014) [1.7] . The rule-book will also be subject to further amendment as a result of this Directive, Ibid [1.8]. The Directive was also prompted by the financial crisis, irresponsible lending being a particular target. Commission Staff Working Paper 'Summary of the Impact Assessment accompanying document to the proposal for a DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on credit agreements relating to residential property' (SEC 2011) 355 final, (Brussels, 31.3.2011) p 5. For a discussion of the comparison between EU and UK regulation in light of these latest developments, see Brown above n 4. 24 Disclosure: MCOB 4-7, Responsible lending: MCOB 11, Action on default: MCOB 13.
MCOB will extend to second charge lending, currently under the umbrella of the CCA and CONC, from March 2016. Any new lending requiring a second charge on residential property from this date will, therefore, also be outside the ambit of ss 140 A-C. 26 For all other credit agreements, s 140A allows the court to consider the terms of the agreement, and the behaviour of both the creditor and those who act on its behalf. 27 In addition, the test centres on the finding of an unfair relationship between creditor and debtor, rather than an unfair agreement, 39 Many borrowers took out this insurance either unwittingly or when they did not really need it or understand its terms. 40 [2010] ECC 8. 41 And therefore recoverable by the borrower, as not only had the debtor never agreed to take out the insurance in the first place, she had then paid for it on the basis of mis-information [2010] ECC 8 at [19] .
to the conclusion that whilst the credit agreement itself would have been in no danger, the related PPI was a different matter. The essential problem for the creditor was the lack of transparency, in relation to the commission the creditor would receive if the insurance were taken up, and the lack of any indication the debtor could look elsewhere for cover. 42 The Willett's presentation of the competing ethics of protection and selfinterest/reliance provide appropriate benchmarks, dealing as they do with protection of the vulnerable, as against trader interests and consumer self-help, all integral issues to borrower protection. These ethics, as defined, are concerned with the extent to which substance of agreements should be controlled, dependant upon the extent to which any given procedure should be seen as adequate, and the importance or otherwise of the impact of terms and practices upon consumers.
Transparency has a large part to play. Whilst the protective ethic concerns itself with protecting the vulnerable, regardless of information given, by controlling not only harsh practices, but also the substance of agreements and therefore the consequences of unfair terms, the self-interest/ reliance ethic relies on information as the basis of protection, so encouraging consumer self-help. 55 This has resonance with the identification of a 'decentralisation' of consumer regulation, which, as discussed by Ramsay, 'responsibilises' the consumer, 56 information being the primary means of pursuing and protecting his/her interests. However the self-interest/reliance ethic goes beyond this: here, it is also the trader's interest that is promoted, in that as long as required information is given about terms,
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Reflecting to some degree Adam Smith's assumption that 'homo economicus' will pursue selfinterest-information, if adequate, will allow the consumer to do this U Reifner J Niemi further interference on the part of the law is not forthcoming. 57 The consumer must use the information to protect him/herself, and will not be shielded from consequences that follow from entering into the agreement. In contrast, ss140A-C suggest the protective ethic, with the much wider ability to examine substance and procedure where unfairness may be evident.
Particular procedural requirements are not relied on as the basis of protection. So, 57 Willett, above n 11, at pp 412-415, 423. 58 Arguably reflecting a neo-liberalist approach with its emphasis on individual responsibility and expansion of markets. For a detailed discussion of neo-liberalism and recent problems in relation to financial services and consumer credit, see I Ramsay, T Williams, 'The crash that launched a thousand fixes: Regulation of consumer credit after the lending revolution and the credit crunch' in A Kern, N. Moloney (eds) Law Reform and Financial Markets (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011). 59 In terms of facilitating real consumer choice. 60 Willett, above n 11, p 414. 61 By allowing as sufficient the reconstitution of the copy from a number of sources, rather than from the original agreement itself, see the decision in Carey.
in accordance with the underlying ethic, here protective, the decisions in Thorius and Yates, in considering ss 140A-C, seem to illustrate that any lack of transparency, regardless of required procedure will be fatal to an agreement, if there is clear detriment to the consumer. 62 They suggest vulnerability is to be shielded from any shade of exploitation, at the expense of enforceability of the agreement even though there is no breach of transparency rules as such. The decisions focused on the impact of creditor practice (here non-disclosure) on the consumer, with the creditor's self-interest in not providing the information being sacrificed in favour of protecting the consumer from consequences of entering the agreement. 63 By the same token, in the earlier case of Patel v Patel, 64 the lack of information given by the creditor was seen as contributing to the exploitation of the borrower, although here the circumstances of the relationship clearly led to the borrower putting trust and confidence in the creditor, to such an extent that it constituted undue influence. In the words of Willett (discussing undue influence and general clauses in relation to unfair practices) any information that was given was 'unlikely to overturn the psychological commitment to the transaction'.
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The Court of Appeal decision in Harrison however, exhibited a very different approach. Here there was a demonstration of the self reliance/interest ethic at play; it was clearly felt that consumers had some responsibility in protecting themselves and that traders must be allowed to some extent to act in their own interests. A seller is not ordinarily obliged to warn his buyer that his product is expensive when compared to other similar products and in my judgement it is telling that in this heavily regulated market no such obligation has been imposed… [T]he absence of shopping around was the result of a perception amongst borrowers, shared by the Harrisons, that the PPI offered was a condition of the loan….In this case that belief was self-induced. It is not suggested that it gave rise to an unfairness in the relationship.
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In other words here the consumers only had themselves to blame. The creditor could not be expected to pay for the outcome of the borrowers 'not doing their homework' or making a potentially misguided choice. Indeed, this seems to take
Willett's self-interest/self-reliance ethic one step further. Here there is no 'reliance' on information by the consumer, which justifies the creditor's position.
Rather, as long as rules are complied with, (which here they were) this of itself is enough to allow the trader's self-interest to prevail, even though the borrower has little in the way of informational tools to draw on. . Aside from potential evidential differences, the essential question-whether an unfair credit relationship could be found where there was no breach of regulations-was the same.
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LLP was an independent finance broker which arranged Mrs Plevin's loan (a consolidation of existing debt together with new borrowing) together with 5 years of PPI cover. Both it and Paragon were intermediaries for the purposes of ICOB, although in this instance, in relation to the sale of the insurance, the ICOB Rules only applied to LLP-see n 85 below. 85 As required by ICOB, and the FISA and FLA regulatory codes. The ICOB requirement only applied to LLP, as it was the intermediary in direct contact with the customer in relation to the sale this could be seen as something done, or not done, by or on behalf of the creditor for the purpose of ss 140 A-C. Here the court did not feel constrained by the The basis of unfairness therefore was regarded as any imbalance which severely restricts choice otherwise available to the borrower, and includes omission of the creditor to take reasonable steps to guard against such unfairness.
It could be argued the decision on its facts, still hints at an essential role for transparency, as it was the ignorance of salient facts that was seen as the cause of unfairness here. However the court made very clear any number of factors, involving circumstances, borrower characteristics and questions of degree are all potentially relevant. These go beyond simply having the opportunity to make an informed choice and reflect the primary goal of protecting the consumer.
Nevertheless, although the protective ethic seems to inform the court's approach, it was emphasised creditors' interests would not automatically be sacrificed at every incident of borrower detriment. 95 The Supreme Court viewed a creditor's underlying desire to protect its own interests as not fatal to the fairness of the creditor/borrower relationship. This is of course does not automatically mean creditor's motives are irrelevant to a finding of unfairness, 96 but rather any motivation should be seen within the context of reasonable or expected 94 Ibid at [18] . 95 However it still leaves us with the question as to what extent the protective ethic can be effective as a basis for protecting credit consumers.
Protection and self-interest/reliance in controlling unfairness in consumer credit transactions
There is a wealth of literature, which discusses the concept of contractual fairness 98 and its role in consumer contracting. Unfairness by its very nature is a fluid concept, judged, whether objectively or subjectively, on the situation in which it arises; this can lead to difficulty in interpretation. 99 Those who frame the law must decide what they want to achieve and refine the law's target if it is to Consumer credit can be an emotive subject, tinged with moral outrage about the 'exploitation' by certain types of creditor, for example payday lenders and those that offer short term, high cost credit. In effect, the provision of certain types of credit to particular groups of the community can offend our sense of 
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A closer examination suggests it is the effect of the sales practice on the customer that is at issue, not the practice itself, and the decision in Plevin rightly reflects this, giving some emphasis to the necessary causative nature of the creditor's behaviour. 112 However it is also the nature of the consequences of entering into a consumer credit agreement that prompts concern. The operation and/ or enforcement of credit terms can lead to consequences, which range from the unfortunate and expensive, to the devastating. There are benefits of course, namely the pecuniary advantages brought by having money, such as the ability to acquire goods and services, but it is the potential for negative costs, not only financial, that attract attention. These consequences may well arise because the consumer has been exploited, because their circumstances have changed or because, quite simply, they have entered into a bad bargain. One might argue this, with nothing more, gives rise to unfairness, as any advantage to be had from entering the agreement is destroyed. On this basis all consumers are potentially vulnerable: they may not fully understand or sensibly engage with consideration of all potential outcomes, and indeed behavioural economics tells us this is the case. 113 If it is envisaged legal intervention should then take place, clearly this is a protective approach.
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Yet whilst the protective ethic may seem appropriate where vulnerability is present, that is not to say all vulnerability necessarily merits legal protection against unfairness, or certainly to the extent contracts should be dismantled. For instance, whilst outrage may well be justified in relation to some circumstances surrounding credit provision, arguably it is also observable even without evidence of calculated deleterious creditor behaviour. The only way to completely protect in this situation would be to ban 'objectionable' products or control contract terms. This however is a dangerous strategy: interest rate caps, now being imposed on the payday lending market, are a good example of this. As the often advocated arguments set out, such measures open the possibility of driving the problem underground, and 'good' suppliers will leave the market as it is no longer in their interests to remain. 115 The provision of consumer credit is a business like 113 Bounded rationality, heuristics and biases, eg information overload selective optimism and mental shortcuts ('availability heuristic'). Here there is little point in, for example, using behavioural assumptions as to how the decision to borrow is reached-externalities (for example poverty) force the consumer's decision. Who should have the responsibility for consequences then? This is when the creditor's knowledge becomes relevant. For whilst life events, which lead to inability to pay back debt may be unforeseen, it is possible to forecast the likely effect of certain events (for example a period of unemployment) on a particular borrower's ability to pay; if credit is offered in the knowledge the borrower would struggle to pay in this situation, then this is in effect irresponsible lending and a form of exploitation beyond, it is argued, what is acceptable.
However whilst the concept of responsible lending is now receiving some emphasis in terms of current policy, it is not without difficulty. Criticisms centre on the limited nature of responsible lending measures, being based in the neoliberal approach of reaction to market failure, 119 which has resulted in 'responsibilisation' not only of the lender but of the consumer. 120 The problem here is that this presumes transactions take place in the context of a basic level of sophistication, or average set of circumstances in relation to the consumer, which as discussed above can be problematic for the vulnerable. See FCA 'Detailed Proposals for the FCA regime for consumer credit' CP 13/10 http://www.fac.org.uk/views/cp13-10-consumer credit-detailed-proposals. 136 The MCD governs all secured lending to consumers where the security is in residential property, or where the credit is given to facilitate the acquisition of rights in an 'existing project or building' Art 3 (1). 137 Eg credit-broking and debt counselling. 138 For example ss 77-79 CCA which deal with provision of copy agreements and statements. 139 Lomnicka, above n 10, p 15. 140 There are some exceptions-FSMA provisions allow unenforceability in respect of agreements/arrangements entered into as a result of very specific instances-for example contravention of specific rules relating to credit charges and roll -over loans s 137C or agreements entered into by unauthorised persons. FSMA 2000, s 137C. legislation are not 'easy to rationalise'.
141 FSMA primarily follows breach of statutory duty via s150, 142 where there is non-compliance with rules set out by the FCA. 143 However, unlike the unfair credit relationship test, this does not require a consideration of the wider effect of such breach on the relationship between the parties, and any breach has a prescribed effect: damages for loss. 144 The problem however is not just one of the approach to remedies. Aside from questions of rules-based versus principles based regulation, which will not be discussed here, the basis of the unfair credit relationship test highlights potential further conflict between the two sets of regulation. Whilst Government accepts there needs to be a 'tailored' approach to the consumer credit market, 145 the extent to which these two regimes are really compatible requires examination.
The approach of FSMA and the regulator suggests adoption of the selfinterest/reliance ethic, with an expectation that consumers will protect themselves appropriately, if given the right informational tools. 146 Transparency provisions are key to the regulatory framework, and in this respect reflect the approach of the CCD, which relied heavily on information disclosure, 147 and the MCD, although the latter does refer to creditors acting 'fairly.' 148 This, arguably, is in contrast to the development of specific modern UK consumer credit policy, primarily in 141 Lomnicka, above n 10, p 20. 142 Lomnicka above n 10, p17. This is available where the creditor is an authorised person: if unauthorised the creditor will commit a criminal offence and the agreement will be void. 150 The FCA recently consulted on this and a cap was introduced on 15 January 2015 'Proposals for a price cap on high-cost short-term credit' CP 14/10 15 July 2014. http://www.fca.org.uk/news/cp14-10-proposals-for-a-price-cap-on-high-cost-short-term-credit (accessed 12th December 2014). 151 Eg In relation to home credit and pay day industry -BIS, above n 149, p13.
actions. 152 At a more general level recent policy in relation to protecting the credit consumer also seems uncertain. In the consultation paper on reforming the consumer credit regime, published at the end of 2010, 153 focus on vulnerability does not feature in the reform objectives. The emphasis is on simplification, coherence, and 'effective and appropriate' consumer protection, with consumer responsibility having a role to play. 154 This is more reflective of FSMA language, grafting onto consumer credit the approach taken to other financial services, with greater emphasis being placed on balancing interests of all market participants. This is not to say of course that protecting consumers more generally against unfairness is now ignored and protection of the vulnerable is also more in evidence in more recent consultations. 155 There is the proposed retention of some criminal offences, 156 and now market intervention via 'charge' caps and ability to ban products. 157 These latter initiatives may be unsophisticated tools, which can bring their own problems, but demonstrate a move away from earlier political ideology in the UK observed by Ramsay as, to some extent, favouring choice and inclusion rather than protection from the market. 158 The Principles of Business, which set out how the FCA expects firms to conduct their business, allude to 152 Eg the banning of sales commission and retail incentives at the point of sale for store cards ibid at p 4 153 HM Treasury above n 2. 154 FSA 'Journey to the FCA' http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/journey-to-the-fca-standard.pdf at p 8; www.fca.org.uk/firms/being-regulated/meeting-your-obligations/fair-treatment-of-customers. requirements, the lynchpin of the self reliance ethic. There is also some lack of clarity in policy statements in relation to the acceptable extent of consumer responsibility; for example, limited understanding is recognised as a problem, yet it seems there will simply be reliance on greater transparency. 167 The problem is that greater transparency does not necessarily translate into greater understanding. 168 Nevertheless responsible lending demonstrates the aims of consumer credit and financial services regulation do have some similarity. In the CCA regime, b) The future of the unfair relationship test as a means of 'bridging the gap'
Interpretation, through these ethics of protection and self-interest/reliance of current approaches to financial services, more particularly consumer credit, demonstrates the problems that arise in relation to levels of consumer protection against unfairness, which like vulnerability is a fluid concept. Policy in relation to retail financial services, other than consumer credit, has been shown to promote consumer responsibility as part and parcel of consumer protection, and in its general approach has reflected a bias towards the self-interest/self-reliance ethic.
Yet, this of itself is not undesirable; as Campbell and Loughrey point out, it is not 'legitimate' self interest of providers that has been the problem, but its metamorphosis into greed, engendered by market culture, that needs addressing.
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Nevertheless, such self -interest, whilst consistent in its goals, can lead to 179 Certainly a tension is recognised between the objectives of consumer protection and competition, but there is no real indication yet of how this will be resolved-'both competition and consumer outcomes can be at odds with one another', but at this stage no further clarification is given: FSA above n 164 at p 11; the FCA do not got much further stating this will be approached on 'a case by case basis' FCA 'The FCA's Approach to advancing its objectives' (July 2013) p 10; see also 199 Third, the CRA contains measurements of unfairness-good faith, significant imbalance and consumer detriment-and employs indicative and blacklisting of terms. 200 Whilst the basis of assessment required by the CRA is still relatively wide, taking into account the nature of the contract and surrounding circumstances, the protection here, reflecting that contained in the UTCCR, does not generally look to rescue a consumer from an entire contract, 201 but rather to assess whether individual terms imposed were unfair. 202 This is in contrast to ss 140A-C, which allows the court to look beyond individual terms, to the relationship behind the agreement, 203 and in effect to the bargain as a whole. It provides, in essence, a more holistic approach. Furthermore it allows an examination of behaviour whenever it has occurred, unlike the CRA and UTCCR, which concentrate on terms present at the time the contract is made. 204 For different reasons, in relation to behaviour, the CPUTR may be a poor substitute;
these regulations are problematic in that, apart from the amendments in relation to misleading and aggressive commercial practices, there is no avenue of personal redress, 205 and the basis of complaint is based in how an 'average consumer'
would have been affected by the practice, reducing the scope for subjectivity and protection for the vulnerable. 206 This then is unlikely to provide a suitably flexible alternative to the unfair credit relationship.
So where does this leave ss 140A-C in any future regime? At a practical level, many consumers may wish to shun court action, 207 and it is unlikely to be the choice of a truly vulnerable individual, unless lucky enough to have access to
proper advice or funding. However it should be remembered that the test can be a shield as well as a sword, in that it can be invoked by the borrower, if proceedings are brought against him/her. It could also be argued that providing a cause of individual action is not an effective way of itself, to more broadly protect consumers against unfairness. 208 Yet, the test can still be to consumers' advantage more generally, where the court has wide enough powers that will grab creditors' attention if invoked. 209 However this if course depends upon the basis upon which the court uses such powers, so demonstrating the importance of the ethics underlying court decision. This does not however mean only one set of ethics, whether self-interest/reliance or protective is appropriate. It is arguable these differing approaches are simply the positive and negative of dealing with unfairness. The unfair credit relationship test bridges the gap between these approaches. For whilst the Principles and Rules in CONC provide parameters for acting fairly, in effect creating obligations to behave in a certain way, 210 the ability to set the agreement aside for unfairness provides an underlying negative controli.e. to not act unfairly in a given circumstance, so creating a safety net for individual situations. Vulnerability can be protected, but as appropriate. The danger of course is uncertainty, which inevitably has a negative impact on credit 
Conclusion
Until the Supreme Court decision in Plevin, as the ss140A-C case law has developed and reached the higher level courts, judicial approach has looked creditor friendly. This is not necessarily surprising. As Willett notes, the judicial bias towards self-interest/ reliance has been evidenced in the past by the Supreme 211 In that for example in relation to interest rate controls, the decision to implement such controls is side stepped by leaving it to the courts to decide a price is unfair, something which is unlikely to happen. Ramsay above n 149, p 92. 212 Plevin, above n 88, at [10] per Lord Sumption.
Court's own approach to unfair terms, 213 and to that extent Harrison continued this trend; this is potentially dangerous for the vulnerable consumer. 214 However, one might argue cases such as Harrison are peculiar to their context. Some were seen as unmeritorious and/or speculative, 215 and to that extent, one wonders whether the court would use any means possible to deny the claims. 216 In any event, in relation to PPI, there were and are other avenues of redress available,
where it can be shown the insurance had/has been mis-sold, 217 and there was perhaps an underlying sense that the court was not the best place for this to be resolved. Furthermore, when referring to the FSA's policy statement about the mis-selling of PPI, Tomlinson LJ in Harrison set store by the fact non-disclosure had not been identified as a factor leading to consumer detriment. This suggests the outcome of the case may have been different had the complaint been about behaviour that had indeed been identified as detrimental. 218 The Supreme Court in Plevin, however has exhibited a more consumer friendly approach. It has been clear in its support of a wider interpretation of ss 140A-C, so re-asserting the test's independence from other regulatory obligations and sanctions already in place. Quite rightly, where a creditor does not comply with the relevant practice, he will find it more difficult to justify his behaviour. There is a truly difficult balance to be made between protecting all consumers and protecting those most in need. For by being too 'protective' in terms of the consumer community as a whole, the result might actually result in increase in detriment for those who need protection the most, and constriction of choice for those who can protect themselves.
There seems to be a tension between the underlying ethos of ss 140A-C and the objectives of the FCA, which, whilst making reference to the diverse nature of the consumer community, are geared towards risk, responsibility, competition and enabling innovative markets. It is true that the recent consultation papers demonstrate evidence of a move towards regulating unfairness more directly and ensuring fairness certainly has a role within the new rules on consumer credit transactions, with more detailed provision in relation to assessing affordability etc. 220 The issue of vulnerability now plays some part, with detailed guidance on behaviour that is likely to be seen as not in a client's interests.
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However all this is still influenced by concerns for the market, which illustrates the problem with any kind of regulation or decision making process in this area.
The danger is resultant regulation that 'falls between two stools'. Striking the right balance will prove difficult. Ironically perhaps, the most recent activities of the FCA, seen by some as over-zealous, demonstrate how easily, if the FCA get it 220 Also reflected in the new rules on mortgage transactions. 221 The supplier having to act with these in mind -See CONC 2.2.2 G.
wrong, markets can be adversely affected in the short term, and reputationally, the harm may be more far reaching.
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Application of the 'competing' ethics of protection versus selfinterest/reliance in analysing the basis of the CCA and FSMA approach illustrates the potential incompatibility between ss 140A-C, devised as the ultimate protection for the vulnerable credit consumer, and the FSMA regime. But in fact does this matter? There is an argument for accepting that both ethics have a part to play in consumer protection, allowing them to complement rather than compete with each other. Whilst an untidy solution, fairness, and, by correlation unfairness, are untidy concepts; measurement of them is necessarily an inexact science. Selfinterest/reliance provides an element of certainty but cannot provide a complete answer to consumer protection, and does not allow for individuality of consumers.
Consumer protection is essential but as the exclusive ultimate goal of regulation it brings a danger of being the victim of its own success, with unwanted side effects.
It is submitted the unfair credit relationship test's flexibility allows both set of ethics to play a part, acting as a balance between self-reliance and protection, by providing a means of individual redress, which allows individual circumstances to be taken into account. This allows negative exploitation of consumers, perhaps the most unpalatable element of unfairness, to be prioritised and tackled in the most effective way. 
